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Abstract
Background: It is increasingly common for two or more treatments for cancer to be combined as a single
regimen. Determining value and appropriate payment for such regimens can be challenging. This study discusses
these challenges, and possible solutions.
Methods: Stakeholders from around the world attended a 2-day workshop, supported by a background paper. This
study captures key outcomes from the discussion, but is not a consensus statement.
Results: Workshop attendees agreed that combining on-patent treatments can result in affordability and value for
money challenges that delay or deny patient access to clinically effective treatments in many health systems.
Options for addressing these challenges include: (i) Increasing the value of combination therapies through
improved clinical development; (ii) Willingness to pay more for combinations than for single drugs offering similar
benefit, or; (iii) Aligning the cost of constituent therapies with their value within a regimen. Workshop attendees felt
that (i) and (iii) merited further discussion, whereas (ii) was unlikely to be justifiable. Views differed on the feasibility
of (i). Key to (iii) would be systems allowing different prices to apply to different uses of a drug.
Conclusions: Common ground was identified on immediate actions to improve access to combination regimens.
These include an exploration of the legal challenges associated with price negotiations, and ensuring that pricing
systems can support implementation of negotiated prices for specific uses. Improvements to clinical development
and trial design should be pursued in the medium and longer term.
Keywords: Cancer, Combination therapy, Cost‐effectiveness, Costs, Economic evaluation, Value‐based pricing,
Pricing, Reimbursement
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Background
Cancers usually arise through the accumulation of mul-
tiple genetic events or genomic alterations and often de-
velop resistance to single drug treatments [1, 2]. For this
reason, combination regimens have been the mainstay of
treatment for many cancers. Historically, these regimens
tended to combine newer on-patent medicines with low-
cost off-patent medicines. Recently it has become com-
mon for two or more on-patent treatments to be com-
bined. This reflects an increasingly large drug
development pipeline and a desire to make new treat-
ments available to patients quickly. Often several new
treatments are introduced in a short space of time, and
frequently these are combined into a single treatment
regimen. The end result is expensive treatments, leading
to significant affordability challenges for many payers.
Furthermore, combination regimens are often found not
to represent good value for money by health technology
assessment (HTA) agencies and pricing and reimburse-
ment bodies [2]. For these reasons, patient access to ef-
fective novel combination therapies for cancer is
restricted or denied in many health systems.
In this paper we explore the challenges in valuing and
paying for combination regimens in cancer, drawing on
discussion at an international workshop on this topic,
held in Sydney in November 2019. Our focus, and the
focus of the workshop, is on combination therapies be-
cause of their preponderance in cancer, and because
they typically result in more expensive regimens and
more complex pricing and valuation considerations than
monotherapies. There has been an academic discussion
of the topic in the literature, [1–5] but, interactions with
payers, patient organisations and industry indicate that
they all feel that action is required. Our paper reports on
the views of senior representatives of these and other
stakeholders from around the world attending the Syd-
ney Workshop on the challenges and – critically – how
to address them. We identify where there is agreement
on how to proceed and on where further discussion is
needed. In this paper, first we describe the valuation and
payment challenges raised by combination therapies in
cancer. Next, we summarise the set-up of the Sydney
Workshop. We then outline the options for addressing
these challenges discussed at the Workshop. Finally, by
way of discussion, we suggest a series of actions for ad-
dressing the challenges, before offering concluding re-
marks. Throughout, we attempt to capture what
emerged from extended discussions at the Workshop,
summarising material from the much longer meeting re-
port [6] in order to make it more accessible and likely to
impact future policy discussion. This paper is not a con-
sensus statement from those present at the Workshop
or the organisations they are associated with. It is a con-
tribution to the debate, aiming to stimulate discussion
(and hopefully agreement and action) within and be-
tween the various stakeholder groups, nationally and
internationally.
Challenges associated with combination drug regimens in
cancer
In this section we highlight the problems associated with
the valuation and pricing of combination therapies using
two hypothetical scenarios, and one real example. Then
we consider whether the challenges differ depending
upon the HTA and pricing systems in place.
Hypothetical scenarios
Combination therapies are usually developed in one of
two ways: two or more existing treatments might be
combined, or one new treatment might be added to
existing therapy.
First, consider two drugs that already exist as mono-
therapies. Both bring a value of ‘1’ when given as mono-
therapies, and are priced to value, so both have the same
price, say ‘1’. Now assume that combining the two drugs
provides a value of 1.5, at a cost of 2 (1 + 1). The com-
bination regimen adds value, but whilst the total cost of
therapy has doubled, value has not. Hence, the combin-
ation would be unlikely to be considered good value for
money.
Second, consider a case where one drug exists as
monotherapy, and an add-on treatment is developed.
The existing monotherapy must be given in every add-
itional month lived, and is priced so that providing each
extra month of life is just supported by the added value
that is delivered. When combined with the existing ther-
apy, the new add-on treatment results in patients living
an extra 12 months, but, as a result, requires 12 months
more treatment with the existing therapy. Because it is
already priced at the boundary of what the system is pre-
pared to pay for each additional month of survival, there
is little or no headroom left for any additional costs as-
sociated with the new add-on therapy. Hence, the com-
bination would not be considered good value for money
– in some circumstances, even if the add-on therapy was
provided at zero price. This would be true, irrespective
of the number of additional months survival combin-
ation therapy produced.
Pertuzumab – a real world example
In 2013, pertuzumab in combination with trastuzumab
and docetaxel was appraised by the National Institute
for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), for adults with
human epidermal growth factor 2 (HER2)-positive meta-
static or locally recurrent unresectable breast cancer [7,
8]. Pertuzumab was an add-on treatment, and trastuzu-
mab and docetaxel represented backbone therapy. It is
important to note that the initial NICE appraisal of
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pertuzumab was undertaken before the final analysis of
the pivotal clinical trial was available [7]. At this time,
data on overall survival (OS) were limited, with median
survival not yet reached in the pertuzumab arm of the
pivotal study [7]. NICE guidance on pertuzumab was
reviewed in 2018, at which point stronger evidence on
OS was available [9]. It is worth noting that in the real
world, HTA and payer bodies are often required to make
initial assessments of treatments in the face of substan-
tial uncertainty around key endpoints, so this example is
not unusual.
During its initial appraisal, NICE’s Appraisal Commit-
tee concluded that adding pertuzumab to trastuzumab
and docetaxel provided progression-free survival (PFS)
gains of approximately 6 months [7, 8]. In the absence
of confirmatory data, the OS advantage associated with
pertuzumab was considered to be highly uncertain, and
in one scenario analysis considered by the Appraisal
Committee it was assumed that there would be no add-
itional post-progression survival gain attributed to the
addition of pertuzumab – thus, the 6 month PFS gain
would lead to a 6 month OS gain. According to calcula-
tions by NICE’s Decision Support Unit (DSU), the add-
itional 6 months cost of remaining in PFS – comprising
of backbone drug and administration costs and support-
ive care costs – was £13,627, even if pertuzumab had
zero price [3]. The quality adjusted life year (QALY) gain
of 6 months spent in PFS was 0.39, using a utility score
of 0.79 [3]. Therefore, the incremental cost per QALY
gained from the 6 month PFS gain, with zero price at-
tributed to pertuzumab and no additional OS gain, was
£34,712 (£13,627/0.39). Given NICE typically considers
new treatments cost-effective if they provide one QALY
for an incremental cost of less than £20,000 to £30,000,
[10] pertuzumab would not normally be considered
cost-effective even if it had zero price. The Pharmaceut-
ical Benefits Advisory Committee of Australia also con-
ducted an appraisal of pertuzumab in this indication,
used similar analyses, and drew similar conclusions [11].
Whilst this analysis only constituted one scenario con-
sidered by the NICE Appraisal Committee, and, as
noted, this appraisal was reviewed in 2018 when more
OS evidence was available, this pertuzumab example il-
lustrates a case where a new add-on therapy could be
considered “not cost-effective even at zero price”.
Do the challenges depend on HTA and pricing systems?
Two approaches are commonly adopted by HTA agen-
cies when assessing the value of treatments: a “thera-
peutic added value” approach with outcomes expressed
in clinical terms; or a “QALY approach”, where clinical
outcomes are translated using utilities into QALYs. The
former is an approach used in France and Germany,
whereas the latter is used in the UK, Sweden, Canada
and Australia.
Whichever approach is taken, when appraising com-
bination therapies HTA agencies and payers must ad-
dress the following issues:
1) Do the combination of drugs produce outcomes
that justify their overall cost (or, given the expected
outcomes, what overall cost would be appropriate)?
2) Given the expected outcomes, can an acceptable
price be negotiated for the drugs involved?
Irrespective of whether a therapeutic added value or a
QALY approach is taken, it may happen that the com-
bination regimen is more effective than the backbone
therapy alone, but the producer and the payer/HTA
agency cannot agree upon a satisfactory price. It may
even be the case that no non-zero price exists for the
add-on therapy that would be considered to represent
good value for money.
Issues such as “not cost-effective at zero price” become
most apparent in systems that explicitly estimate cost-
effectiveness, but issues of access, affordability, and valu-
ation of combination regimens also exist in countries
where HTA focuses on added clinical benefit [2]. The
HTA authority determines the therapeutic added value
of the new combination compared to the existing back-
bone. Based upon this, the pricing authority considers
the total cost of the combination regimen, comprising of
the cost of the backbone therapy (which will have an
existing price) and the cost of the new add-on treatment.
Where the existing price of the backbone component of
the regimen is high, the headroom for an acceptable
price for the add-on therapy may be low. This could cre-
ate access issues, if the price that the authority is pre-
pared to pay for the add-on therapy is unacceptable to
the producer of that therapy. In addition, issues around
valuation and value attribution are highly likely to arise,
if the relative price split between the backbone and add-
on therapies is predicated on the pre-existing price of
the backbone therapy and perceived to be inequitable.
Jurisdictions around the world also differ with respect
to pricing systems. In “price taking” systems, the price
initially set by the manufacturer is taken into account by
the HTA agency or payer in their assessment of whether
the treatment represents good value for money. In “price
setting” systems, the payer initially determines the price
at which they are willing to permit reimbursement,
based upon their assessment of the value that the new
treatment provides.
In practice, most systems involve some element of
price negotiation, implicit or explicit. However, in the
context of combination regimens, manufacturers only
have the power to amend the price of a portion of the
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regimen, if constituent parts are provided by different
companies. Thus, price negotiations may be less
straightforward and more restricted in the context of
combination regimens. Further, in a system that is price
taking in nature, there would appear to be little oppor-
tunity for renegotiation of a pre-existing price of an
existing backbone therapy during an assessment of a
novel add-on treatment. In contrast, in theory at least, a
price-setting payer would appear more able to take the
initiative and re-set the price that they are willing to pay
for a backbone therapy during an assessment of a novel
combination regimen. The practicalities of changing the
price of a backbone therapy when used in combination
are likely to be country-specific and may depend, for ex-
ample, on existing pricing and reimbursement legisla-
tion, the responsibilities of individual national agencies
and mechanisms currently available to achieve price
changes.
Methods
The Sydney International Workshop
The Workshop was convened by Bellberry, a not-for-
profit organisation that promotes and improves the wel-
fare of research participants and the quality of research
[12]. The Workshop was conducted over two days and
attended by fifty-three people from patient organisations,
regulators, HTA/payer bodies, universities (ethicists,
statisticians and health economists), and life sciences
companies from Australasia, Asia, Europe, and North
America. The programme included presentations from
various attendees, and plenary and break-out group dis-
cussions. Attendees received in advance a detailed
agenda for the meeting, a background paper, [13] and
copies of five relevant publications and reports [1–3, 14,
15]. The development of these materials was overseen
by a Scientific Committee (see the meeting report for
further details on attendees [6]).
The pre-read documents provided to attendees in-
cluded a literature review of options to address the valu-
ation and payment challenges presented by combination
regimens in cancer [13]. In addition, prior to the meet-
ing, attendees were asked for potential solutions/ways
forward, and whether they were engaged in, or aware of,
any current work in the area. Further ideas emerged as
discussion as the meeting progressed.
Participants agreed that attendees should be free to re-
port anything said in the discussions, but not which par-
ticipants said it. They also agreed that the background
paper and a full meeting report should be publicly avail-
able, [6, 13] but that the slides presented should be avail-
able only to participants. These arrangements were
designed to protect potentially sensitive information and
to promote free and open discussion by ensuring the
confidentiality of individuals’ contributions.
Results
Challenges - summary
Attendees at the Sydney Workshop agreed that the
challenges associated with valuing and paying for com-
bination therapies in oncology were truly international.
Although challenges manifest in different ways between
systems, affordability, value for money and value attribu-
tion were consistently challenging issues that can impact
patient access.
Whilst attendees agreed that the challenges outlined
above are common and important, they were keen to
clarify that the challenges only arise when more than
one on-patent treatments are combined, and when dif-
ferent manufacturers produce the constituent parts of a
combination. It was, however, noted that a different
challenge to patient access to new combination therapies
can arise where old drugs are repurposed and found to
be clinically effective in a new low-cost combination use.
Often these regimens lack a manufacturer sponsor to
take them through regulatory and HTA processes. This
is tangential to the challenges associated with providing
access to new high cost combination regimens, but is an
important issue that needs addressing [16–18].
Options for addressing the challenges presented by
combination regimens
Attendees categorised potential solutions into three
‘buckets’ (Fig. 1). The general challenge amounted to the
cost of combination regimens often being too high,
given their perceived and/or assessed value when price is
determined. The three buckets of solutions involved:
1. Increasing the value of combinations, through
improved clinical development and trial design to
optimise clinical regimens.
2. Being willing to pay more for combinations (over
and above single treatments offering comparable
value).
3. Aligning the total cost of the combination to the
demonstrated value, by using flexible payment and
pricing mechanisms to adjust the prices of
individual constituent medicines.
The remainder of this section describes each of these
options as they were discussed at the Workshop.
Bucket 1: Increase the value of the combination – clinical
development and trial design to optimise clinical
regimens
Attendees considered it may be possible to increase the
benefits associated with combination regimens whilst
potentially reducing their costs through optimising
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treatment regimens. This idea was not identified in the
literature – it was suggested by Workshop attendees.
Optimising treatment regimens may involve altered dos-
ing schedules, treatment durations and supportive care re-
quirements. Reduced toxicity, improved quality of life, and
lower costs could result, increasing the likelihood that
treatments would represent good value for money. Discus-
sion focused primarily on the use of stopping rules. It was
noted that sometimes submissions to HTA agencies at-
tempt to model these, but evidence on their impact on ef-
fectiveness is usually lacking – making it difficult for HTA
agencies and payers to incorporate stopping rules into
their decision making. It was felt that, if treatment regi-
men alterations such as stopping rules are deemed clinic-
ally valid and potentially cost-saving, evidence on their
effectiveness should be collected.
Targeting combination regimens specifically at patient
groups who are most likely to benefit from them was
also identified as an approach that could increase the
value of new treatments. Whilst valuable, this is difficult,
because it is likely to require development of diagnostic
tests and/or improved monitoring of patients to identify
responders (or those most likely to respond). In addition,
attendees agreed that it was important to ensure that all
relevant outcome measures were collected in trials, in-
cluding patient relevant measures, to ensure the true
value of therapies can be demonstrated.
Attendees supported increased use of adaptive trial de-
signs and platform trials, which could allow altered dos-
ing regimens, stopping rules or diagnostic tests to be
incorporated within ongoing trials [19–22]. Attendees
supported the use of combined scientific advice pro-
cesses – whereby HTA agencies, payers and regulators
provide joint advice to manufacturers on trial design and
clinical development programmes. This could identify at
an early stage of clinical development cases where inves-
tigation of alternative treatment regimens could be par-
ticularly worthwhile – allowing useful data to be
collected. Also, there was agreement that pharmaceutical
companies and HTA agencies/payers should work to
make more use of post-launch randomised and observa-
tional studies to provide information on alternative
treatment regimens.
Bucket 2: Pay more for combinations
Attendees recognised that HTA processes could be
amended to increase willingness to pay for combination
therapies for cancer. Most HTA agencies have flexible
decision-making criteria, such that recommendations are
not based solely on whether a new treatment provides
value for money according to rigidly specified thresholds
or criteria. For example, ‘therapeutic added value’ sys-
tems usually compare the benefits and costs of a new
treatment and those of other treatments for the same
condition, with no explicit reference to a willingness to
pay threshold. In systems that do specify thresholds,
these are often flexible – NICE specifies a threshold range,
which differs for end of life treatments and technologies
defined as “highly specialised” [10, 23]. And in Sweden,
different thresholds are used for different disease areas
[24]. In general, it is not unusual for orphan drugs to be
given special consideration by HTA and payer bodies [25].
Given this flexibility, ‘combination therapies’ could be
used as a modifier in the decision-making or value assess-
ment framework, permitting higher prices. This approach
has been suggested in the literature [2].
Attendees generally agreed that there are benefits to
having flexible cost-effectiveness thresholds, broader
value frameworks and flexible deliberative processes in-
corporated into HTA. Attendees agreed on the import-
ance of HTA processes capturing the full value of all
therapies assessed. However, they considered that special
provisions could only be made for combination therapies
for cancer with an evidence-based justification. Evidence
that society values combination therapies more highly
than other treatments, including monotherapies for can-
cer, would be needed. Workshop attendees were not
aware of any such evidence, and thus could see no
grounds for such special provisions for combination
therapies. It was recognised that if willingness-to-pay
Fig. 1 Three Buckets – options to address the challenges associated with valuing and paying for combination therapies in cancer. CE: Cost-
effectiveness, WTP: Willingness to Pay
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was increased for combination therapies and this was
not consistent with societal preferences, this could come
at the expense of other treatments offering more health
gain, resulting potentially in net societal losses.
Bucket 3: Aligning the total cost of the combination to
the demonstrated value – flexible payment and pricing
mechanisms
Workshop attendees generally agreed that when existing
monotherapies are combined and produce value that is
not proportional to their combined cost, it would be ap-
propriate for constituent prices to be re-visited and ne-
gotiated. Similarly, when new add-on treatments are
combined with an existing backbone therapy and pro-
vide clinical benefit, it is appropriate for the price of the
backbone therapy to be re-visited in its new use. This
has been suggested in the literature, [2, 4] but raises is-
sues of implementation, value attribution, and legal chal-
lenge, when the constituent therapies are made by
different manufacturers. These issues were discussed at
length at the Sydney Workshop, as reflected below. An-
other suggestion in the literature [4] - that combination
regimes could be re-developed as single products - was
also discussed but felt to be impractical. Similarly, at-
tendees expressed a concern that without progress on
ways to revisit and adjust prices of constituent therapies,
manufacturers of new add-on treatments might decide
to develop their own “me-too” versions of backbone
therapies (over which they would have control of price),
representing an inefficient use of valuable drug develop-
ment resources.
Bucket 3: Implementation
Attendees recognised that if the prices of existing treat-
ments are to be re-visited as part of a combination regi-
men price negotiation, a key consideration is whether
the price is changed for all uses of the treatments (i.e.
for their use as monotherapies, and/or their use in other
disease areas), or only for their use as part of the com-
bination therapy being appraised. To limit dis-incentives
to price negotiation, attendees suggested multi-use pri-
cing is likely to be required – allowing prices to differ
for a treatment depending upon the disease area it is be-
ing used in, and/or depending on whether it is being
used as monotherapy or as part of combination therapy
[2, 14, 15]. Price discounts or budget caps could also be
used to achieve price reductions for specified uses.
Pricing systems to allow multi-use pricing may be
complex and costly to run and may need to be taken
into account in assessments of value for money. Any
multi-use pricing mechanism would ideally be based on
good data on the use of cancer treatments, including
clinical indication, therapy line, type of combination,
dosing and treatment duration. In some countries,
potentially appropriate data are already collected (e.g.
the Systemic Anti-Cancer Therapy dataset in England
[26]). Alternatively, reasonable assumptions about differ-
ential use of treatments would need to be agreed, based
on epidemiological data and whatever health system data
are available. Or, this information combined with a value
assessment for each use of a product could be used to
calculate an appropriate weighted average price across
all uses of a product. Attendees noted that some coun-
tries lack sufficient flexibility to make this work.
Workshop attendees felt that the exact method used
to implement price adjustments for constituent parts of
a combination regimen was relatively unimportant –
whether through multi-use pricing, discounts, budget
caps, or combinations of these. However, having a sys-
tem in place that could support such methods was cru-
cially important – without this, price negotiation could
not achieve a solution to the challenges raised by com-
bination regimens. Attendees agreed that HTA agencies
and payers should communicate clearly with manufac-
turers types of flexible pricing model acceptable to
achieve price reductions for combination uses. In some
countries, suitable pricing mechanisms and data collec-
tion systems may need to be developed.
Workshop attendees recognised a further barrier to
re-visiting the prices of constituent parts of combination
regimens concerns incentives. If a backbone therapy is
in use and produced by one company, and a new add-on
therapy is developed by another company, has the
manufacturer of the backbone therapy sufficient incen-
tive to enter into price negotiations with the producer of
the add-on? [4]. In principle, patient access to the com-
bination therapy could increase backbone therapy sales.
If, however, negotiations are likely to reduce the price of
the backbone therapy in the use under appraisal and in
its other uses, the company may see limited gain, and
could incur losses, from negotiating. The length of time
remaining on the patent of a backbone therapy may also
influence the willingness of a producer (and a payer) to
negotiate, as might the producer’s own drug develop-
ment pipeline. Multi-use pricing could alleviate some of
the dis-incentives to negotiation, but attendees also sug-
gested that appraisals of combination regimens that raise
issues around the value for money of backbone therapies
in the new use should trigger the re-assessment of (and
possible disinvestment in) the use of backbone therapies
in their existing uses. This could act as an incentive for
manufacturers to negotiate.
Bucket 3: Value attribution
If the prices of the constituent parts of combination reg-
imens are to be negotiated, consideration must be given
to how prices (or values) of these parts should be
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determined, and who they should be determined by. This
was of particular concern to a number of attendees.
Options for ‘how’ value could be attributed between
constituent parts of a combination regimen have been
discussed in the literature [2, 4, 13]. Simple options
exist, for example, splitting the revenue equally. A
formal quantitative value attribution framework could
be used, where value is based upon the estimated
benefit that each constituent part contributes to the
combination – though this may not be straightfor-
ward to calculate. Attendees felt that research into
value attribution frameworks for combination regi-
mens would be useful, and should involve multiple
stakeholders (including HTA agencies and academia)
to increase credibility.
Attendees differed as to ‘who’ should be responsible
for attributing value to constituent parts of combin-
ation therapy. Some attendees felt this was the re-
sponsibility of the pharmaceutical companies –
several HTA representatives felt strongly that HTA
agencies and payers are responsible for assessing the
value of overall treatment packages, not individual
constituent parts of combination regimens. Other at-
tendees felt that value attribution was a natural role
for HTA agencies and/or payers, because their remit
was to value healthcare interventions. Even if an HTA
agency did not feel it appropriate to attribute value to
constituent parts of a therapy, there might be an im-
portant role for it as a broker of discussions between
companies. Whoever attributes value, it was recog-
nised that deliberative processes would be required. It
is unlikely that prices could be set solely using quan-
titative methods. There was agreement that value at-
tribution should be addressed early in the HTA
process – ideally before reimbursement submission to
HTA agencies or payers – to avoid delays in the ap-
praisal process, which would delay patient access.
Bucket 3: Legal challenges
Many attendees were concerned about the legal chal-
lenges that price negotiations between companies
present. Legal experts explained the issues, including
competition law around collusion. Some attendees sug-
gested that participation of a third party – an HTA
agency or payer – may help, echoing the literature [2].
Attendees were also told about a platform designed to
enable companies to trade, without meeting, under the
supervision of HTA agencies. However, legal experts ex-
plained that the involvement of HTA agencies and
payers in price negotiations may not solve the legal
problems, and in some circumstances may raise add-
itional issues.
Attendees recognised that the legal issues are critical,
and may dictate whether price negotiations offer a
practical solution to providing affordable access to ef-
fective combination therapies. Attendees strongly agreed
there was an urgent need for pharmaceutical companies
and HTA agencies/payers to explore the legalities of
price negotiations between companies (with or without
the involvement of HTA agencies and payers) recognis-
ing that what is permitted may vary by jurisdiction, and
may require amended legislation.
Discussion
Attendees from all around the world agreed that com-
bination therapies in cancer present important problems
for affordability, value for money, and patient access.
There was substantial support for actions to improve pa-
tient access to clinically effective high-cost combination
therapies. These actions are listed in Table 1, highlight-
ing which stakeholders have responsibility for taking
next steps. More discussion is required within specific
jurisdictions to agree action plans and allocate actions to
different stakeholders.
It is important to note that whilst the Sydney Work-
shop included many stakeholders from several countries
around the world, it did not specifically include at-
tendees who would provide an international, rather than
nation-specific, perspective. This may be important, be-
cause pharmaceutical companies are typically global, and
operate within global investment markets, and therefore
their decision-making needs to be understood from this
perspective. The interaction between national-specific
HTA agencies and payers with global pharmaceutical
companies operating in international markets may be an
important consideration in future thinking to address
the challenges associated with combination therapies for
cancer.
Whilst implementing systems that allow pricing ne-
gotiations to take place represents an important
short-term step towards allowing combination therap-
ies for cancer to represent good value for money, we
believe that improved clinical development pro-
grammes are worthy of further investigation. In fur-
ther research it would be useful to investigate the
potential impact on value calculations of improved
benefits associated with previously appraised combin-
ation therapies to examine whether, for example,
shorter overall treatment regimens, or reduced tox-
icity through altered dosing schedules could lead to
different value-for-money conclusions.
Conclusions
There is an urgent need for pharmaceutical compan-
ies, HTA agencies and payers to work together. Im-
proving clinical development programmes is essential
but will take time to achieve. More immediately,
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legally permissible approaches to price negotiations
between companies (with or without HTA agencies)
need to be identified or developed in jurisdictions
around the world, and pricing systems need to be
made flexible enough to implement multi-use prices
in some form.
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